The Medals Of Our Defeat.

By Calum Young

Despite the recent upsurge in Taliban violence, victory is still possible, if London and Washington redefine the war they are fighting in Afghanistan

When Eduard Shevardnadze, the last Soviet Foreign Minister, arrived in Kabul in 1989 he knew the situation was difficult. The Soviet Union was financially bankrupt and its satellites were capitalising on this weakness by exerting pressure on the centre. Moscow could no longer afford to maintain its presence in Afghanistan and both Shevardnadze and the international community knew it.

In fairness the Russians’ dilemma was not all of their own making. By the late eighties the American government was happy to see Moscow humiliated in Afghanistan. The CIA wanted revenge for Vietnam and was only too pleased to watch an erstwhile rival retreat following an overseas debacle. Support from Islamabad was also not-forthcoming. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s government in Pakistan had opted to tow the American line. She refused to support further intervention. Thus, Shervadnadze went home isolated. Two weeks late he recalled Soviet troops and awaited defeat.

The great irony is that the Soviets didn’t lose. For three years after the Russian withdrawal, the government they backed led by President Mohammed Najibullah remained in place. Using networks of patronage, political cunning and the promise of infrastructure development the combined might of Taliban warlords were kept at bay. This was a victory of sorts for Najibullah who was eventually exiled in 1992 and it illustrates the path toward securing Afghanistan today.

As the American General Stanley McChrystal has noted, the U.S cannot shoot its way to victory. Power does not grow out of the barrel of a gun in a country where anyone inclined to can purchase an AK-47. American power lies in its wallet not its armoury. Just as Najibullah maintained his position through circulating patronage through a complex web of chieftains and local War Lords, Washington can as well. The Taliban are not united by ideology, class, or ethnicity. Afghanistan is a nation divided by five mile strips in a semi-feudal system which governs the localities. Language and customs change as often as the terrain. Rather, what unites the American enemy is financial convenience.

Most of the, often illiterate, men who make-up the Taliban have fought for numerous other causes in the last twenty years. Usually, allegiances swap according to which ruler holds preponderance over an individual’s township. Other fighters have been driven into the Taliban’s ranks by the coalition’s decision to decimate Opium production in the opening months of occupation. Afghanistan still remains the world’s biggest Heroin supplier and if that industry is targeted again, support for Western Intervention will be further challenged.

What this amounts to is a sacrifice of ideals. Circulating patronage and allowing Opium production to continue will ultimately mean doing deals with amoral and often violent members of the Taliban elite. This is a subject which both Washington and London are divided on. But there have been signs that the position of local leaders is becoming more flexible. In a ten-page statement drafted in November of 2009, Mullah Omar, a Taliban leader pledged that the ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan would take constructive measures together with all countries towards mutual cooperation’.

This is not to say the British and American troops are pursuing mistaken objectives. Stable democracy, the rule of law and a developing economy based on legal goods are not ignoble goals for Afghanistan. They are merely unobtainable. Coalition forces lack the knowledge to unpick the labyrinth of Afghan politics which steeped in an obscured inheritance from the middle-ages. Western armies since their arrival have lacked language abilities, even now, 9 years on there is a shortfall of Dari Persian and Pashto speakers. Despite their superficial might, foreign armies also lack the numbers and finance to achieve their goals. At a time when international aid budgets are more stretched than ever, a genuine long term commitment is unlikely. A simple comparison is the number of troops required to restore peace to Kosovo in the mid nineties, which reached 1 soldier per 2000 of the population. In Afghanistan that figure is 1 soldier per 200,000.

However, all is not stacked against Washington and London should they choose a path of dialogue. For centuries the road toward control of Kabul has led through Islamabad and there is reason to believe that Pakistan’s current government may welcome American diplomatic efforts. Certainly, the current government would not welcome a total American withdrawal. The prospect of civil war developing in the backyard and the destruction of influence in Kabul is not in Islamabad’s interests. Pakistani officials also fear the rise of Indian interest in the region which could displace their own interest. In December 2009, intelligence reports from ISI ( the Pakistani intelligence forces) briefed that they would use their power over Taliban officials to initiate discussion - a significant breakthrough in relations.

Success in Afghanistan has ceased to be a question of honour. Coalition forces must do away with anachronistic conceptions of neo-imperialism if they are to achieve real success on the ground and obtain security. Bargains with the Taliban are not easily struck and few diplomats are in favour of dealing with individuals with such violent records. However these are necessary evils if the success of Najibullah is to be repeated. Often the greatest victories are the least glorious.